Moceradi

Na svojem sprehodu po gozdu (Holzweg) je Matjaz opazil sedem moceradov, kar je precej manj kot zadnjic, ko jih je njegovo pot preckalo petindvajset.

Matjaz na Mestnem vrhu pri Ptuju

Matjaz je obiskal Mestni vrh pri Ptuju, kjer mu je stric Francek pripovedoval o svojih izkusnjah ko je bil pek in raznovrstni delavec med drugo svetovno vojno v Nemciji v ujetnistvu, skupaj s Francozi, kako se je vrnil domov v negotovem obdobju, ki je sledilo, in kako je Pepka sama oskrbovala zivino ter orala. Francek je zadnji preziveli stric; danes se poslavljajo od tete Milike.

Seppo Sajama v sredo 3. novembra ob 14:40h in 18:50h

Finski filozof Seppo Sajama bo v Ljubljani predaval in se pogovarjal s profesorjem Potrcem v sredo 3. novembra 2010. Ob 14:40h bo govoril o svojem razmerju do slovenskega filozofa Vebra, ob 18:50h pa bo predstavil svojo izbrano temo. Oboje se bo dogajalo na Filozofski fakulteti, Askerceva 2, soba 434.
Seppo je poslal naslednje zacetne misli:

2:40h: Najprej bo podal svoj pogled na Vebra, in sicer o (a) estetiki, (b) zadevanju, (c) modelu duha od predstav do misli.

6:50h: Za drugo predavanje napoveduje nekaj o psiholoskem ozadju zmernosti, ki je lastna le ljudem, ki si lahko zamislijo dve ali vec moznosti za dejanje. Vprasanje zadeva temelje svobodne volje: intencionalnost zavesti. Tukaj je skrajsan povzetek, ki ga je poslal:
     TEMPERANCE AND TOLERANCE
 1. Some comments on the word "temperance"
 2. Plato on temperance
 3. Tolerance in the liberal state
 4. Differences between tolerance and temperance
 5. Can temperance be excessive?
 6. Why be temperate?
 7. Is temperance voluntary?
 8. Is ethics subjective?
 9. The naturalistic foundation of ethics
 10. What is a rational plan of life?

Video posnetki predavanj 2009/2010: vednost, nejasnost, resnica, vesela filozofija

 Tukaj je povezava s spletne strani prof Potrca do video posnetkov njegovih predavanj:
Video posnetki izbranih predavanj v letu 2009/2010: 1- Vednost, 2 - Nejasnost, 3 - Estetska sodba pri Vebru, 4 - Resnica, 5 - Noč čarovnic in pomen, 6 - Naperjenost in razmerja, 7 - Vesela filozofija, 8 - Moje učiteljice, 9 - Dogovor, 10 - Enakost, 11 - Enakost in smisel, 12 - Lepi vzorci, 13 - Zgradba spoznavnega sveta, 14 - Ubožni realizem (za ogled je potreben Windows Media Player, BS Player ali podoben predvajalnik).

Jesenska hoja po gozdu

Jesen je prijetna za gozdne sprehode.

Pomembnost duha, predstave

Prof. Gerard O'Brien bo imel v sredo, 13 oktobra 2010 v sobi 434 na Filozofski fakulteti v Ljubljani dve predavanji. Sledita povzetka v angleskem jeziku, kot ju je predavatelj poslal vnaprej. Prvo predavanje bo ob 14:40h:

1. How Does Mind Matter?

Nothing could be more obvious than that minds matter. Specifically, nothing could be more obvious than that mental phenomena—beliefs, desires, thoughts, perceptions, and so forth—have a causal impact on behaviour. Yet it has proved notoriously difficult to explain how this can be so. The problem of mental causation takes a number of forms in the philosophy of mind. One of these arises from the widely held thesis that the representational properties of mental phenomena are not determined by the intrinsic properties of brains. In this lecture I will explain how this version of the mental causation problem arises. I will then suggest that the apparent insolubility of this form of the problem stems from the “referential” conception of mental content that dominates the philosophy of mind. Once we recognise we are not obliged to accept this conception, and moreover that there is an alternative conception available, some elbow room is opened up for exploration. I will conclude the lecture by briefly exploring the space created by this alternative conception of mental content.

Drugo predavanje bo ob 18:50h, prav tako v sobi 434:


2. Reviving Mental Representation in Cognitive Science

Several lines of argument have lately converged to make trouble for representation in the philosophy of cognitive science. The charge, in a nutshell, is that mental representation no longer earns its explanatory keep, and hence that it’s time to discard this troublesome concept. This lecture will begin with a brief explanation as to why mental representation is on the endangered list in cognitive science. It will then proceed by exploring the nature of representation in connectionist models of cognition. The general aim will be to determine whether representation does play an important explanatory role in these models, and hence whether the recent calls to dispense with this concept are justified.